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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?

AIRLINE DEREGULATION:
CRASH LANDINGS AND THE
PARACHUTE OF ARISTOTLE

Having collected almost 100,000 frequent flyer miles on USAir, I decided to
visit my son at his school in North
Carolina. I got my "certificate" and called
USAir over one month before the flight.
This was October, not a holiday in sight. I
asked for a reservation. All flights were
open-I could fly direct, and I could leave
whenever I wanted. Then I mentioned that
this would be paid by a frequent flyer
mileage certificate. "Oh, well, we do not
have space for you on any of those
flights," Fay of US Air explained in a practiced monotone. "Well, what do you
have?" "We have a red-eye going into
Pittsburgh which will connect into North
Carolina the next day, and the trip back is
pretty much the same; it will have to be the
all-nighter with two stops and plane changes, taking a day and a half." "Wait a
second, a moment ago you told me you
had space everywhere. Now you have
nothing and the flight's more than a month
away in a non-traffic period. How come?"
"Well, we only allocate some of our seats
for the frequent flyer program." "Oh, I
don't remember seeing that in the ad ... how
many seats on the twelve direct flights I
cannot get have you reserved for frequent
flyers?" "I cannot give you that information."
Airline Deceptive Practices

I had just been the victim of a classic
"bait and switch" unlawful business practice. You advertise a benefit to bait consumers; then you either disparage or even
refuse to provide the advertised bargain,
"switching" the consumer to a high-profit
product or service. 1
And it wasn't just USAir. Southwest
Airlines did the same thing the following
year. They widely advertised their "buddy
fare" -on certain flights over certain
periods, buy one ticket and get another for
your buddy for free. But it turns out they
do the same thing-reserve a very small
number of seats for the program to attract

customers, and then force them to pay full
fare in order to get the flights they need.
Then I got my American Airlines
mileage statement. They have now
declared that my mileage may "expire"
and they are going to start subtracting
mileage earned more than a given number
of years ago. Needless to say, this was not
the focus of the "American Advantage"
advertising campaign when I signed up.
These and other airline deceits are justified on an interesting legal basis. To
those who object, the airlines point to a
small-print clause in an obscure document
saying that "rules are subject to change."
In other words, we can promise you
whatever we want, but we will not be held
to our representations because of a
clause-which we wrote-giving us the
right to change the rules anytime we want
to do so. We reserve the right to give
ourselves permission to lie to you. This
theory has never been tested in court as a
defense, probably because no attorney
wants to risk the ridicule of raising it.
Airline Unfair Practices and
Anticompetitive Results

These practices are, regrettably,
symptomatic of a much deeper malaise
affecting the nation's air carriers. Beyond
the open gauntlet of advertising deceit is
a collection of competitive abuses warranting greater concern. Most of them
have arisen following the Airline
Deregulation Act of 19782 and the subsequent dismantling of the Civil
Aeronautics Board in I 985. First, there
has been increasing concentration of
ownership. During the last quarter of
1986, a spate of mergers occurred, and the
trend is clearly in the direction of consolidation. In California's market alone,
USAir bought out PSA, American Airlines
gobbled up AirCalifomia, Delta took over
Western Airlines, and Alaska Airlines captured Jet America.
Although economists will point to
theoretical "ease of entry" into the airline
industry, one has to have gates at the airports. Major airports grant long-term
leases; Los Angeles and San Francisco
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airport leases, for example, last from ten
to thirty years. Buying a competitor, or
driving him out of business, may not result
in effective new competitive entry.
Second, the contest to decide who is
bought or driven out is not based necessarily on fair market competition where
the firm with the best service or most
efficient operation prevails. For example,
some airlines control the travel agency
computer systems booking much of the
nation's travel. When the system of
American Airlines or United Airlines is
used, one does not have to guess to predict
that the layout of fares, the orderof presentation, and other marketing techniques
used by the airlines controlling the computer booking systems will favor their
own flights. Of course they do.
But the most major unfair practice currently extant and thriving favors the "deep
pocket" carrier, or the carrier with an area
of monopoly power which may be exploited to cross-subsidize operations
where it has competition. The consumers
in the monopoly market are egregiously
overcharged so that one competitor may
drive out of business possibly more efficient carriers in another market.
The competitive pattern in this industry has increasingly degenerated into
price discrimination and predation, leading to bankruptcies and "industry
shakeouts," which then become tight
oligopolies acting as cartels. That is, once
the aggressive price competitors are either
purchased or driven out, the sagacious
deep pocket survivor will likely benefit
from a resulting "I will fight no more
forever" oligopoly-the economic term
for a shared monopoly. 3
If one of the carriers is particularly
large, it will likely set the rates. Quite apart
from the mutual advantage, none of the
small competitors dares to compete if it
believes that the larger firm can and will
go below cost if it is sufficiently irritated,
financed by either its larger size or by its
surfeit of monopoly business in other
markets. 4
To be sure, the model of the free market
may dictate a challenge where prices are
excessive. The reality, however, usually is
not a challenge, but conservative actions
to maintain the small marketshare which
gives the large entrepreneur "cover"-the
patina of a non-monopoly-while all participants eventually move toward the extraction of excessively high prices. This is
not a zero sum game; it is better to achieve
a mgher rate of return on a small marketshare than to risk a competitive war which
will have to be lost by you. And once the
large entrepreneur has actually demonstrated a willingness to go below cost to
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drive others out, the lesson is easily
learned. In the real world, entrepreneurs
would rather make friends with a stronger
bully than risk annihilation-so long as
the bully makes room for their comfortable operation. Although at odds with
economic theory, this human pattern
seems rather obvious to anyone who is not
seeking-or has not already obtained-a
Nobel prize in economics.
This predictable pattern is exactly
what has been happening in the airline
industry: occasional but vicious price
wars, followed by bankruptcies, mergers,
and then oligopoly leading to price increases and service diminution. When
they see this dynamic, the free marketobeisant economists like to argue that all
is well-the market is supposed to shake
out the inefficient. True, but the market
should be doing so based on performance
in the marketplace and the exercise of
consumer choice, not based on deep pockets or unfair practices. And the result
should allow continued new entry and
vibrant competition between the increasingly efficient survivors. That is not what
is happening.
Let's take an example. On March 6,
1990, it cost $480 to fly round-trip from
San Diego to Sacramento. One could fly
to Europe for less than it cost to go from
California's second largest city to its capital. [Of course, the airlines are smart
enough to give a huge discount to legislators and government personnel, who fly
at one-fourth the regular price.] The
market was a tight oligopoly with USAir
as price leader. Southwest Airlines was
virtually the only competitor "on the
make" and willing to price independently.
But Southwest did not then serve San
Diego-Sacramento. A lack of airport gates
in Sacramento was one impediment. But
in markets where Southwest offers competition to these same carriers, fares are
one-fourth to one-third the per passenger
mile rate of the $480 San DiegoSacramento charge. Thankfully for some
of us, Southwest entered Sacramento; immediately, fares from San Diego to
Sacramento were magically cut to onefourth the previous level.
This pattern is not one of fair or effective competition. It is one of price discrimination and predation. USAir is determined to drive Southwest out of business-not by providing better or less expensive service, but by cross-subsidizing
from excessive charges where it does not
face Southwest competition to accommodate very low fares where Southwest
appears.
This pattern appears to mimic to some
extent the pricing expected during healthy
2
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price competition, except it has two drawbacks. First, while it is going on, it grossly
misallocates resources. Passengers pay
distorted prices where carriers are not
engaged in battle. For example, Alaska
Airlines has a virtual monopoly on intraAlaska air travel. It is not surprising that
the fares from Juneau to Anchorage, Fairbanks, or other cities in Alaska are much,
much higher per passenger mile than they
are in Alaska's California operations
(where it faces competition from Southwest). Alaska also uses its reservoir of
monopoly power to finance its contest in
California. While this is going on, people
travelling in Alaska are paying unfair and
excessive charges for air travel.
Second, although those of us in San
Diego are delighted to be the subject of a
price war, it is a Pyrrhic and temporary
victory for us. At some point the war will
end, usually one of three ways: Southwest
will be bought out to get rid of the annoyance; Southwest will be driven out of
business; Southwest will join the club.
Then prices will go up-and if there is not
another Southwest in the wings (sorry) to
challenge prices and go for marketshare,
the prices will rise slowly but inexorably
without the benefit of service, efficiency,
or other entrepreneurial improvement.
Needed: Refined Regulation

So are we saying that the airlines
should not be deregulated? No, the
regulatory system in place twenty years
ago was fundamentally a cartel operation
protecting the most inefficient carriers
from competition. In fact, the net effect of
deregulation has been positive. But the
long-range prognosis is bleak. Because in
the process of deregulation, the government has not fully absorbed the obvious:
that the choice is not between regulating
to the maximum comfort of those regulated and a competitive system where they
do whatever the hell they want.
Another model exists-one of refined
regulation. It is governed by the following
maxim: We stimulate maximum competition, but we regulate in a targeted fashion
where market prerequisites preclude effective competition or where there are external costs in the absence of regulation.
We may want to deregulate an industrythat is, end an intrusive paternalistic system of price controls, entry barriers,
licensing, standards, and the rest of it. But
we need not do so carte blanche. We may
decide not to deregulate as to a part of an
industry where competition is lacking;
and where we do rely substantially on
competition, we maintain the deceptive
advertising, antitrust, and unfair competi-

tion prohibitions which properly apply to
the competitive sector.
At least theoretically, the Gompetitive
sector of the marketplace is also subject to
societal safeguards and limitations. If you
lie, you are punished. Deceptive advertising is actionable. You cannot engage in
unfair competition without sanction. Price
discrimination with the intent or effect of
lessening competition is unlawful.
Predatory practices violate Business and
Professions Code section 17000 et seq.
And so on. Not only are these laws applied
properly to this particular industry, but
much greater scrutiny is justifiable given
the common carrier nature of the industry
and the tendency toward oligopoly. And
finally, where the passenger volume or
other market features are not amenable to
real and continuing competition, there
must be regulatory oversight-including
rate review. The framework underlying
these positions should not be controversial. Economic actors have a choice: either
they compete in a fair and useful manner
or, if they degenerate to a structure inhibiting price competition and noncompetitive
prices are likely, they are regulated. You
either compete or, if you have a monopoly
or cartel, you are regulated in a way to
preclude the abuses flowing from that lack
of competition. You do not get the cartel
and a blank check for the public to sign.
That is the principle. And it is that basic.
Applying this principle of refined
regulation to airlines or insurance or the
plethora of other businesses to which it
should apply is not difficult. Either a
relevant submarket in a given geographic
market of such an industry has workable
and effective competition or it does not. If
it does, regulate only as you do the competitive sector generally-for deceptive
advertising, antitrust, unfair competition,
and perhaps to inhibit or assess external
costs (e.g., pollution or safety). But these
areas are not subject to barriers to entry,
rate controls, detailed standards, and
agency supervision. If effective competition is lacking, then target the regulation
to prevent the abuse arising from the
market flaw at issue.
This means that we properly do not
"deregulate" all airline markets or, as we
discuss in the comment below, all insurance or all aspects of savings and loans.
We discriminate based on the economic
condition and state of competition within
relevant markets-conditions which may
vary within an industry. And we may
properly regulate competitors in one
market as to maximum price, while allowing competition to dictate prices for the
very same industry with other competitors
and a different economic reality some-

The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol.12, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992)

COMMENTARY
place else. It is possible to distinguish
between situations where you regulate and
situations where you do not, and that need
may vary within a single industry. Hence,
the pattern we now insist upon-we either
regulate or we do not regulate, without
regard to particulars-is wrong. It is
universal, but it is wrong.
In the case of airline regulation, as with
many others, we commit the sin of
generality-applying the same basic system across markets of varying regulatory
need. We impose a single cookie cutter, as
if it is impossible to vary the system within
a single industry and its regulatory
scheme. And the cookie cutter-either all
regulation or total passivity-is applied in
extremis reflecting excess in one direction, and then the other, seriatim. First, we
have no regulation at all. Then airlines are
subjected to detailed regulation by the
Federal Aviation Administration and the
Civil Aeronautics Board covering fares,
routes, and virtually all aspects of opera5
tion. Then when we wake up and realize
that we have been running a cartel at
public expense, we deregulate. But in
doing so, we move to the other extreme
and regulate nothing. We forget about
deceptive advertising law. We forget about
basic antitrust and unfair competition law.
We lack the ability to differentiate what
should be regulated and the ability to
gauge when it should occur, so we don't
do it at all, even in some markets which
have only one carrier and monopoly
power prices become obvious. This will
probably go on until the abuse becomes so
egregious that political pressure builds.
Then there will be the inevitable explosion, sad tales, dramatic testimony,
media exposes, and we' II move back again
to gratuitous, costly, and unnecessary
regulation-eventually controlled by the
industry and inevitably framed to keep the
most inefficient carrier in the history of the
world in operation.
The Prescription of Moderation
Aristotle counselled "moderation,
moderation in all things." His advice well
applies to the state as regulator. Yes, try to
let competition do 1t, but watch it carefully, and enforce the laws refined over many
years to assure a fair contest where cons um er sovereignty decides the
marketplace winner. Then, where you find
narrow areas and markets where the prerequisites to competition are not presentas perhaps in lightly travelled airline
markets-regulate in rifle-shot fashion to
address the abuses created by those flaws.
This might mean nothing more than
limited maximum rate regulation where

oligopoly or monopoly occurs. Apply different degrees of regulation within the industry. Meanwhile, enforce strongly all of
the safeguards against market abuse normally applied to preserve fair competition.
Mattox II and the
Pendulum Swing to Laissez Faire

Proof of the extent of the "hear no evil,
see no evil" problem in the airline industry
as deregulation has led to a combination
of classic competitive abuses is provided
by the infamous Mattox II case of 1990,6
recently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
7
Court in Morales v. TWA.
By way of background, the leading
case in defining the primary jurisdiction of
airline regulation has been for years Nader
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 8 In Nader, the
plaintiff had a confirmed reservation on an
Allegheny flight. He was bumped and
sought damages for breach of contract, et
al. The defense asserted that the system of
airline regulation by the Ci vii Aeronautics
Board was comprehensive; because the
Board (together with the FAA) regulated
all aspects of the fare/reservation system
as well as routes, baggage rules, and virtually every aspect of airline practice, the
common law of contracts and torts was
superseded by this regulatory system. The
defense buttressed its argument with the
fact that the Board was indeed considering
the issue of reservation bumping. The
Supreme Court held that there was no
absolute occupation of the field, and that
unless the CAB specifically permitted a
practice which breached a common law
principle of contract or tort law, the underlying common law applied. The Nader
case was allowed to proceed. 9
But now we have deregulation in the
airline industry. We have decided to let the
marketplace prevail in an industry which
(economists point out) has small, discrete
units of production which may be adjusted
to traffic volume, moved, bought, and sold
(the planes). Hence, so long as safety is
assured, it is not a natural monopoly but is
amenable to effective competition. Congress removed most of the jurisdiction of
the Civil Aeronautics Board and, with the
enactment of the Sunset Act of 1984, the
limited federal powers left were transferred to the Department of Transportation. This included the standard authority
of all regulators to police deceptive advertising.
On November 14, 1988, the attorneys
general of Texas and several other states
notified TWA, Continental, and British
Air that they were engaged in deceptive
advertising under guidelines adopted by
the National Association of Attorneys

The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992)

r
General in 1987. What the airlines were
doing was advertising a price, and then
when the ticket was bought, adding on
substantial "surcharges" for "fuel" and
"tax." This allowed them to charge more
than their competitors while advertising a
lower price-which in tum forced competitors to engage in like deception to
compensate. The defense argued, incredibly, that state deceptive advertising
statutes were preempted by the
"regulatory" authority of the now fang less
Department of Transportation-on the
basis that it had been transferred the power
to regulate deceptive advertising. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals-in a
decision which can only be described as
bizarre-held that the current nonregulation system preempts state regulation and
state deceptive practice laws. Only the
regulator (the Department of Transportation) may enforce them. Good luck. Further, the court implied that this delegation
of authority to DOT covers deceptive
practices and all "unfair acts." Hence, unless DOT stops it, it's Katie bar the door.
The Supreme Court's opinion on this
issue is even worse. In a 5-3 decision, the
Court held that the guidelines adopted by
the National Association of Attorneys
General, which required accurate disclosure of the exceptions and conditions
to advertised "fare bargains," are
economically undesirable. Its logic,
drawn from the seemingly unfathomable
well of University of Chicago ignorance,
is that it is a good idea for the airlines to
deceive people because more people are
thusly attracted to the airlines, resulting in
higher utilization and lower fares.
I am not making this up. "Accordingly,
airlines try to sell as many seats per flight
as possible at higher prices to the first
group [price-insensitive business
travelers], and then to fill up the flight by
selling seats at much lower prices to the
second group [price-conscious pleasure
travelers]. .. .In order for this marketing
process to work, and for it ultimately to
redound to the benefit of price-conscious
travelers, the airlines must be able to place
substantial restrictions on the availability
of the lower priced seats (so as to sell as
many seats as possible at the higher rate),
and must be able to advertise the lower
fares." 10
Let's stop here for a moment. What the
Court is here saying is that it is ideal to
have "value of service" pricing, where the
prices vary according to ability to pay.
Such an arrangement only works in a cartel setting to extract monopoly power
profits. In a competitive market, the business fares would be cut until fully distributed costs are reached. The Court is
3
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here pretending that the airline industry,
instead of being a low-fixed-cost
enterprise with small units of production
(planes) highly mobile and able to adjust
by route and schedule, is a high-fixed-cost
enterprise with enormous unavoidable excess capacity requiring price reductions to
marginal cost to maximize efficiency.
This is, of course, mostly nonsense.
Certainly, few if any economists ever to
study this industry would agree with the
economic underpinnings of the Court's
view. But even if one were to posit the
need for fare reductions to prevent empty
seats, it is possible to do so without lying.
Instead, the Court notes that "requiring too
much information in advertisements can
have the paradoxical effect of stifling the
11
information that customers receive."
The attorneys general were not suggesting
the reprinting of the telephone-book-sized
tariffs with every advertisement, but the
prohibition of deceit. It is possible to advertise a lower rate, even one with conditions, clearly and without deception.
Every other industry is theoretically under
such an obligation. And it is important that
this obligation not be subject to only one
single means of enforcement. The
American system of checks and balances
works because we do not vest in a single
entity final authority to create or continue
an abuse. Virtually every other industry
subject to regulatory control is also subject to public prosecutor or private suit
where it deceives. That multitude of alternative enforcers creates an important
check. The Supreme Court's option, with
little support in the legislative history
cited, confines this important check to a
single institution-and one historically
vulnerable to corruptive capture.
We have moved from a system of industry sycophants protecting existing air
carriers from competition to a system run
by ideologues who have infinite faith in a
market god which deserves a measure of
respect but which is not properly deified.
There is ground in the middle. To occupy
it requires a sense of particularity; a willingness to regulate sometimes and someplaces, and to know why one and not the
other.
Perhaps, perchance, somewhere along
the evolutionary cycle, and before the end
of time, someone will set the pendulum in
the middle. Let us all hope we shall not
have to wait the eons necessary before we
are graced by another Aristotle to teach us
the simplest of truths to still its swing:
moderation, moderation in all things.

4
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FOOTNOTES

I. Often, bait and switch is accomplished by stocking or obtaining a
limited number of the bargain "bait" advertised, knowing that only a small
proportion of those who are likely to
respond to the ad will be able to obtain it.
The limited numbers available are not disclosed. Here, the offense is particularly
egregious because USAir cannot argue, as
is common: "I only bought nine of those
low-priced stereos (although I advertised
to two million people) because nine was
all I could get." Here, the limitation on
supply is self-created and gratuitously
manipulated. They have the product
promised; it is available-but only if you
pay full fare. For a discussion of the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish bait and switch practices, see Tashof
v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2. 49 App. U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
3. If only two to six carriers dominate
a certain route, there may well be implicit
collusion at some point, particularly if
they learn of each other's fares at or before
effectuation. In the Jong run, lowering
fares will simply result in reductions by
competitors, leading to the gradual
realization that following a price leader up
in an eventually established pattern
benefits all of the participants-it is not a
zero sum game, and all can win at the
expense of the consumer.
4. Although free market economists
like to deny the possibility of such behavior, it is easily demonstrable.
Businesspersons do not, in fact, conform
to the mindset as attributed by economists.
That is, they are not idiots. Typically, free
market economists like to argue that such
an oligopoly will not deviate from properly competitive prices because the low barriers to entry will attract newcomers if the
large firm starts to go too high, and that
the smaller existing competitors will also
likely lower prices to attract a larger
marketshare. Such an analysis
misunderstands human psychology. The
new entrant and the existing smaller carrier will not challenge the market leader if
they believe that the leader will retaliate
by going below cost to hurt them. They
believe in maximum revenues as
economists assume, but they believe more
strongly in survival, which economists do
not assume. Perhaps one of the problems
is the difficulty of quantifying the desire
for security. Economists tend to think that
if something cannot be quantified, it does
not exist.
5. See, for example, the proceedings
necessary to obtain but a third carrier from

San Francisco/Oakland to New
York/Newark in 29 C.A.B. 811 ( 1959).
6. TWA v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, _U.S._, 111 S.Ct.
307 ( 1990), later proceedings, 924 F.2d
I 055 (5th Cir. I 991 ), 949 F.2d I 4 I (5th
Cir. 1991), afj'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Morales v. TWA, et al.,
_U.S._, 60 U.S.L.W. 4444 (June I,
1992).
7. Morales v. TWA, _U.S. __ , 60
U.S.L.W. 4444 (June I, 1992).
8. 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
9. The Nader decision is consistent
with the notion of coextensivity of
remedy. The Court viewed itself as the
decisionmaker for basic societal contract
and tort disputes; it is not displaced merely
because of the presence of a regulatory
system unless that system has previously
considered and ruled contrary to the underlying common law policy. The approach of that Court-but certainly not the
Morales Court-is well vindicated by a
Jong series of plaintiff cases across a
panoply of abuses theoretically addressable by regulatory agencies. The most
serious abuses within the real estate industry (multiple listing group boycotts,
extortionate behavior, price fixing), banking industry (NSF check overcharges and
impound account excesses), insurance industry (bad faith refusal to pay claims),
and many others have been brought before
the courts and adjudicated favorably to
plaintiffs. None of them were brought by
regulators. Although each industry has
comprehensive regulatory systems, none
ever entertained these problems-notwithstanding decades of abuse and the
violation of numerous statutes.
IO. Morales v. TWA, supra note 7.
11. Id.
BEYOND AIRLINES:
THE FAILURES OF MODERN
DEREGULATION

To regulate or not to regulate; that is
not the question. As we argue above, we
are jeopardizing the deregulation of airlines by assuming that the question is one
of paternalistic control industry-wide, or
abandonment to competition-even
where unfair or ineffective. We have failed
to deregulate intelligently, to apply refined
regulation, and to continue deceptive advertising and fair competition enforcement which maintains the ground rules
making competition effective. Not only in
the airline industry, but in trucking,
savings and loans, banking, cable
television service, local exclusive
franchises, and more recently in telecom-
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munications have we not learned the lesson of Aristotle preached in the comment
above.
The errors in each case have a common
thread: an inability to understand that the
issue is not whether to regulate, but how
to regulate. There is always some degree
of regulation; even in the Smithian weltanschauung of University of Chicago
naivete, the marketplace is defined by the
larger society. The rules and mores of
transactions are unavoidable. I have put
my manufactured article on the truck to go
to your store; if it is damaged, who pays?
If the smoke from my stack prevents you
from using your property nearby or injures
your family, do I pay the damages so
created or not? All sorts of complicated
rules exist; they cannot be avoided. From
bills of lading to the meaning of warranties, the issue is never whether there
should be some sort of interference in a
"natural marketplace." There is no natural
marketplace; there never has been one. Its
invocation is simply a device to beg the
issues (what are the rules? how much interference should there be? for what purpose? in what manner?) so they are not
decided or addressed.
What we have done repeatedly is to
subject whole areas of the economy to
substantial regulation, and then as the
political pendulum swings to the right, we
have deregulated. But time after time we
have done so by the act of simple release
from the previous regime of regulation.
We have done so as if there is some kind
of natural law to which all such systems
will return upon the mere withdrawal of
the state. The state is the '·'problem," and
its removal subjects the industry to the
beneficence of the invisible hand. Regrettably, most of the impetus behind this assumption emanates from a school of free
market economics whose adherents are
more akin to disciples than to scholars.
They do not pursue truth; they manifest
faith in a doctrine with all of the characteristics of a religion. And their system of
belief has the basic attraction of religious
doctrine: Its rules are internally consistent,
and it seems to explain almost everything.1
But often our systems of regulation
which we have created were designed to
address market flaws which remain after
deregulation and warrant some adjustment. Often, the act of regulation itself has
created market flaws which are exploited
during the deregulation transformation.
The market is, indeed, a force to behold. And its benefits are now being acknowledged across a panoply of varied
cultures and in the homes of its ancient

enemies. So use the market, consider the
market, give it presumptive status perhaps, look for ways to interject its ability
to allocate resources with efficiency and
in response to arguably the purest of
democratic forces-votes by purchase.
But understand what the prerequisites are
for market function consistent with its
beneficial features. Understand the nature
of its limitations and of the flaws which it
may well carry. Consider scarcity, natural
monopoly, imperfect information, adhesion, economic coercion or bullying,
collusion, deceit, external benefits, external costs.
Error#l: Overregulation

There are two extremes in juxtaposing
the flaws of the marketplace against its
benefits. The first extreme is to use the
existence of flaws as an excuse to abrogate
the benefits of the marketplace in unjustified ways. The trucking industry has accomplished this by claiming that minimum and collusively set prices are necessary in order to assure a margin of profit
for trucking to finance safety standards.
The common justification for regulation is
to find some health and safety string, and
pull it.
Modern courts have long since surrendered their role as a constitutional
check on meritless economic regulationall that is required is the invocation of
"safety" or "health." Never mind that
there is no real nexus between the
regulatory system and the value invoked
to justify it. Giving truckers a price floor
may guarantee more revenue and may
keep in business more marginal carriers,
but it does not assure that the extra money
is spent on safety. There are ways to encourage safe performance without
wholesale pricing freedom with proceeds
to be spent wherever the recipient desires.
There are many alternative regulatory
means which connect to the safety or other
justification. But the courts do not want to
examine the difficult justifications. They
do not want to challenge either the expertise or the good faith of legislators or
regulators. They want a bright-line test.
Invoking a health and safety concern
seems to provide it.
The result of this judicial license, and
the political power of profit-stake interests, has been a great deal of unnecessary
regulation for cartel purposes. When the
Board of Landscape Architects decides to
license those who design golf courses to
confine such business to California "architects," it is hardly protecting consumers needing the state's assurance of
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competence (the justification for most
licensing regulatory systems). When the
Board of Accountancy, consisting in
majority of practicing certified public accountants, adopts a rule providing that
only CPAs may use the word "accounting"
or "accountant" in describing their services, it is not regulating for public health
or safety-although it is assuredly invoked. When marketing orders use the
power of the state to tax consumers of
wine, milk, cheese, eggs, avocados, and
beef to finance promotional ads stimulating increased consumption of these supposedly under-ingested products, health
and safety justifications are certain to be
catechistically invoked-and will suffice
to sustain the regulatory act.
Error #2: Underregulation

The second extreme is represented by
airline regulation discussed above, but
hardly confined to it. It occurs usually
following deregulation. Telecommunications have been deregulated and the net
effect, as with airline deregulation, has
been beneficial-at least for the short run.
But here also regulators have gone to the
other extreme and are allowing monopoly
loop operations which remain to give
cross-subsidy advantage to the utility as it
competes in the private competitive sector. The regulator is not watching belowcost practices. The regulator is permitting
the monopoly loop to obtain excess profits
by allowing rate increases by passthrough formulae. The long-run result
may be highly damaging because the same
basic error is being made as with airline
deregulation: In moving from regulation
to deregulation, there is excessive reliance
on a marketplace where there are serious
anomalies. Where the existence of strong
monopoly power and the underlying importance of the industry dictate more
vigilant application of standard antitrust
and unfair practices law, it is instead
suspended or waived to allow the abuses
which led to the regulation in the first
place to proliferate.
Other examples loom around us. The
allowance of exclusive franchises-lawful monopolies-by local governments
for trash hauling or cable service, for example, may be arranged without the requirement of competitive bidding or rate
regulation. State law understandably
prohibits our cities and counties from letting a public construction project of over
$10,000 without competitive bidding because of the corruption which has resulted
historically from bribery to obtain local
business. But in the deregulation of local
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government activities and of cable, we
allow multi-million-dollar exclusive
franchises to be awarded without any bidding and without any required or likely
rate regulation. And the local jurisdiction
may collect a "franchise fee" based on a
percentage of the take-reducing further
the impetus to regulate.
And, of course, the ultimate example
we have just all experienced: the savings
and loan debacle. Same story, lesson still
not learned. When we determined it advisable to deregulate savings and loans to
make them more "flexibly able" to compete with other financial institutions, did
we calculate fully the market-affecting
consequences of federally insured
deposits assuring them profits if they won
and publicly financed relief if they lost?
Did we deregulate thoughtfully, taking
into account market flaws and human nature? The question is now regrettably
rhetorical.
Error #3: The Failure to Refine
Regulation

Sometimes an industry requires tight
price regulation in one of its relevant
geographic or product markets, and sometimes it does not. Natural monopoly, for
example, warrants maximum price regulation-and there may be markets in many
industries which may be served efficiently
by only one provider while much of the
industry is subject to meaningful price
competition. Why must we either overregulate the entire industry, or ignore what
are obvious regulatory needs? In addition
to enforcing generic statutes designed to
protect the marketplace where it can
potentially work (deceptive advertising
statutes, antitrust law, unfair practices
prohibitions), we can arrange for conditional maximum rate and entry controlswhere natural monopoly or other flaws
preclude its efficacy.
As we argue above, airline regulation
is a prime candidate for both vigorous
competition in some markets--enhanced
by enforcement of those laws designed to
further fair competition-and perhaps for
specific entry and maximum rate controls
in markets where the limited number of
viable competitors precludes real competition.
Another prime example is insurance
regulation. In most states, there is both
exemption from antitrust laws-no assured competition-and little meaningful
regulation. The worst of all worlds. In
California, we certainly improved matters
by subjecting the industry to antitrust law
through Proposition 103 in 1988. And the
proposition was sophisticated enough to
6
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recognize that elements of both competition and regulation are appropriate within
a single complex industry. However, the
proposition failed to take the final step.
Rate review is triggered by the size of an
increase proposed by an insurance company.2 The optimum system would examine the insurance submarkets and require rate-of-return maximum rate regulation for any such submarket where available tests for workable competition are not
met. If they are met, the rates would be set
by the marketplace. Review would not
occur. If competition is lacking to assure
market-set prices, there is a fair rate of
return review, whatever the rate proposed.
Such a system obeys the basic prescription
we here advance: If there is a reason to
regulate, regulate there and to that extent.
Apply the rule where there is the reason
for the rule.
What is interesting is the extent to
which we sometimes are so unrefined in
our regulatory systems that we overregulate and underregulate within the same
system. That is, we quite often overregulate in the formulation of entry barriers.
Not only is the admission to an industry,
trade, or profession often too high, but it
is often unrelated to the purpose of the
regulation. A refined system of regulation
requires the system to address its raison
d'etre time and again. But attorneys are
licensed based on a single general examination at the age of 25-never to be
tested again, and never tested in the actual
area where their skills are relied upon. The
same goes for physicians. Here are two
areas where regulation is amply justified-we properly do not rely on the
marketplace. But then what do we do? We
regulate in a way very distantly related to
our purpose. The result is that we do not
optimally accomplish our purpose. A
refined system of regulation of attorneys
would test attorneys in their actual area of
practice, be it immigration, antitrust,
criminal, or tax law. The examination
would not be difficult or off-point, but
would ascertain that the practitioner in
that area knows the basic cases and understands the basic procedures. The test
would be given once every five years to
assure continued competence. The same
process would rightfully guide physician
licensure. The underlying principle?
Regulate narrowly and specifically to accomplish the stated goal.
The most egregious example of the
blunderbuss "know nothing" school of
public policy is easily found at the highest
levels. Take the Dan Quayle Council on
Competitiveness. This Council has taken
over the role of the previous "Bush Task
Force"; that is, it oversees the regulatory

review functions of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) exercised
through the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. Operating outside due
process, the Administrative Procedure
Act, public review, the hearing process, et
al., this group can pull any federal regulation it dislikes for "review." Instead of
following a procedure where financially
neutral officials representing the longrange interests of the people hear evidence
from all sides, duly noticed, and in public,
we have the spectacle of those with a
vested profit stake in policies engaging in
private appeals to officials who have not
weighed the evidence, but who are-let's
face it-more interested in the weight of
available campaign gold than in the
weight of evidence. This is not refined
regulation.
The "Council" is now pushing a
"moratorium" on regulation-all of it-so
business can recover. It pleads that it will
except serious health and safety related
rules from the ban. But that is hardly
refined. Many rules prohibiting corrupt
business practices are rightfully implemented; many rules are desired by honest
businesses knowing that the failure to
adopt an industry-wide standard means
that they are forced into injurious practice
themselves to stay even with competitors.
Sometimes a standard must be imposed
from the outside and across the board for
the benefit of all. The whole notion of a
"moratorium" rests on the demagogic and
lazy assumption that all rules are the same,
or that perhaps they can be divided easily
into two categories: those necessary for
health and safety, which are okay, and all
the rest, which are not. Some rules are
unnecessary, gratuitous, self-serving, and
more costly than alternatives-including
their nullification. Others are important
for many reasons. But they have to be
analyzed on their merits. One cannot say
with any intellectual honesty that a regulation is "bad" or "good" without reference
to what it does. Why is that so hard for
some people to understand? 3
California has followed the federal example with its own Ueberroth Competitiveness Report. Here is the same problem.
All would be better if government simply
"got out." Got out of what? Where? Well,
says Ueberroth, almost everywhere.
Among other things, we should repeal the
Corporate Criminal Liability Act. This is
a law which makes the unremarkable
statement that a corporate manager who
knows of a "hidden defect" which is likely
to cause death or great bodily injury has
an obligation to notify the workers if it
endangers them, or Cal-OSHA if it
threatens consumers. Cal-OSHA is then
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supposed to notify the appropriate
regulatory agency for a review. So if you
find out a product of yours is going to
cause people to die or become disabled,
you have to tell an agency so they can
check it out. Wow, that is certainly unreasonable. Query: Under what definition
of civilization would we countenance the
contrary proposition? If you know your
product will kill and maim (through its
normal and expected use), you shall (or
may) keep it to yourself and let it happen
without letting anyone know. But if we are
in the world of the regulatory demagogue,
that is fine, because we do not then engage
in refined regulation; we engage in a series
of caveperson grunts: regulation
bad ... ugh ... business good .... regulation
make business do things they no
want. .. ugh, that bad .... regulation
stop ... good happen ... belch.
The import of all of this ponderous
prose? The how of deregulation is as important as the threshold decision to
deregulate. Too many treat the entire matter as a "yes" we regulate or "no" we do
not, as if that decision ends the inquiry. As
the current crop of twelve-year-olds likes
to blurt.... NOT!! A decision to regulate, or
to deregulate, begins the inquiry. But we
seem unable to begin it. It's as if our
policymakers have adopted the tensecond attention span of the mass media.
The airline industry has been joined by
local government exclusive franchises
(covering trash, sports arenas, ambulance
services, et al.), telecommunications,
savings and loans and financial institutions, trucking, the cable industry. A long
and costly line has marched before us, one
that is apparently part of a long and costly
line to come. Having ignored history, we
seem condemned-as the cliche goes-to
repeat it. The prediction is not meant to
resonate cynicism, but the pendulum has
swung from unfettered marketplace to
overly burdensome regulation controlled
by those on the inside, and now to irresponsible deregulation absent even the
modicum of competition-maintaining and
fairness-assuring measures we apply
generally.
The question before the house is not
that we have erred; can there be any doubt
of that? It is rather how much of a price we
shall have to pay before we begin to think.
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FOOTNOTES

1. The market economist religion is
actually built upon a traditional theism.
There is an all-permeating god: the
market. It is defined as whatever is after
the removal of state "intrusion." If that
market is left "alone" to function, all
things will emerge as they should in the
long run. Voltaire's Pan gloss has the same
view in the classic essay Candide: All is
as it should be no matter what happens
because god controls all and all is according to his plan; whatever happens is
predestined to be for the best. There is
precious little difference between the faith
creating the "optimism" skewered so
devastatingly by Voltaire centuries ago,
and the faith of Nobel prize-winning
market economists in the unfettered
majesty of their god.
2. Insurance Code section 1861.05
(added by Proposition 103, section 3).
Note that the prior approval review of
insurance rates is triggered by a proposed
rate adjustment of 7% for personal lines of
insurance or 15% for commercial lines.
However, the Commissioner has the
authority to entertain objections by others
to rate increases which do not meet this
test, or to sua sponte examine a rate on his
or her own. Ideally, the Commissioner
would develop a test by rule making keyed
to the degree of competition extant in a
subline of insurance where a rate change
is sought.
3. Five examples of regulations
delayed by this undifferentiated
moratorium-allegedly excluding "health
and safety" rules-are those which would:
require infant formula manufacturers to
report consumer complaints and results of
tests for microbiological contaminants;
tighten rules for preventing industrial accidents involving toxic chemicals;
prohibit sale of child safety seats that are
dangerous when adjusted in certain seat
positions; prevent hospitals from using
inability to pay as a reason for denying
treatment to emergency patients or women
in labor; and require warning labels on
certain toys, balloons, marbles, and other
children's playthings with small parts.
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